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The human species has the sad capacity to destroy the climate of this planet. Many of our 
current behaviors and policies are almost ideally geared to meet this ‘goal’ as quickly as 
possible. The per capita CO2 emission of the United States is approximately twice that of 
the United Kingdom or Japan and three times that of France or Sweden. Why is this the 
case?  
 
Preserving the global climate is the biggest public goods game ever. It is a game that 
concerns all of us, and we cannot afford to lose it. Once the global climate is destroyed, 
then even double-digit percentage gains in the stock markets will not make us happy 
anymore. In a simple and elegant experiment, Manfred Milinski from the Max Planck 
Institute for Evolutionary Biology in Ploen, Jochem Marotzke from the Max Planck 
Institute for Meterology in Hamburg and their colleagues (1) have examined the ability of 
people to solve, what they call, a ‘collective social risk dilemma’.  
 
To play Milinski’s game, you need six players and some cash. Initially, all players 
receive 40 Euros in their private accounts. The game has 10 rounds. In each round, 
players can transfer 0, 2 or 4 Euros into a ‘climate account’. At the end of the game, the 
climate account must contain at least 120 Euros. In this case, the climate has been saved, 
and each player receives whatever is left in his private account. If the climate account 
does not reach its target, then the climate is lost with a 90% chance. In this case, all 
players loose all their money.  
 
Thus, in every round players must choose one of three options: invest 0, 2 or 4 Euros into 
the climate account.  Milinski et al call these moves ‘selfish’, ‘fair’ and ‘altruistic’. If all 
players use the fair option (invest 2 Euros) in every round, then the climate account will 
reach exactly 120 Euros and every player will keep 20 Euros in his private account.  
This solution is a Nash equilibrium (2). No single player can deviate from this solution 
and increase his personal gain. If one player contributes more, then he will have less 
income in the end. If one player contributes less, then the target will not be reached and 
the expected income for all will be much lower. 
 
People, however, may not stick to the Nash solution. For maximizing the own income, 
there is an incentive to contribute less and hope that others will compensate. If one player invests 0 in one round, then another player must invest 4 for the total sum to stay on 
target. People who invest nothing are ‘free riders’. They rely on altruists to save the 
climate. But without altruists, also the free riders would make no income in the end. 
Therefore, without altruists there is no incentive to free ride. 
 
Milinski played this game with ten groups of six students. Half of the groups reached the 
target, the other half failed. Those groups who failed had accumulated 113 Euros on 
average in their climate account after 10 rounds. Ironically some of the groups came very 
close, but just did not make it. Clearly, this outcome is the worst possible one and 
minimizes the expected gain of all players. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the game of a group who failed to protect the environment. After 8 
rounds their climate account contained 90 Euros. In the 9
th round the six players 
contributed 16 Euros in total. In the final round, they needed 14 Euros, but they only 
came up with 8. The altruists felt they had already contributed enough. The motives of 
the free riders were unclear. 
 
It is tempting to compare the people in Milinski’s experiment to countries. Then the 
United States would be ‘free riders’, the United Kingdom and Japan would play ‘fair’, 
France and Sweden would be ‘altruists’. 
 
Milinski et al (1) also investigated two variants of their experiment. In one version there 
is only a 50% chance that the climate is lost, if the target sum is not reached. In the other 
version there is only a 10% chance. In these treatments, people generally fail to protect 
the climate: only one out of ten groups reached the target in the 50% version and none 
out of ten groups in the 10% version. This outcome is not so surprising, because in both 
treatments there is no rational incentive to invest in the climate account. Without any 
investment the expected income per player is 20 Euros in the 50% version and 36 Euros 
in the 10% version. It is astonishing that people invested at all in these settings. In the 
50% and 10% treatments people invested on average 91 Euros and 73 Euros, 
respectively. These investments might be the consequence of a priming effect, because 
people were told this game is about saving the climate. On the other hand, these 
observations also suggest that people are willing to gamble for the climate. 
 
A major conclusion drawn by Milinski and his colleagues is that people must be well 
informed about the risk of climate change (3-5). If people are misled to think the risk is 
small, they will not cooperate. If people know that the risk is high, they might cooperate. 
The role of scientists must be to inform people about the risk. Moreover, we must invent 
environmental solutions (6-9) and behavioral solutions. But what can save us in the long 
run are only behavioral solutions. We must learn how to cooperate on a global scale, how 
to respect the needs of others and how to avoid an excessively wasteful life style. 
 
Evolutionary dynamics are constructive because of cooperation. Whenever evolution 
invents something entirely new (such as the first cell, multi-cellular organisms or human 
society) cooperation is involved. Cooperation means that one individual pays a cost for 
another to receive a benefit. Natural selection opposes cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work (10). Two such mechanisms are direct and indirect reciprocity. 
Direct reciprocity means that I cooperate with you, because you have cooperated with me 
(11,12). Indirect reciprocity means I cooperate with you, because you have cooperated 
with others (13-15). These two mechanisms are the key components to understand any 
pro-social behavior in humans. Indirect reciprocity works via reputation. Helpful people 
have the reputation of being valuable members of the community and are more likely to 
receive help than free riders.  
 
Procedures should be installed to publicize the reputation of individuals and 
organizations in the struggle to protect the environment. Environmentally friendly 
behavior could be rewarded with tokens of reputation, which may ultimately be regarded 
as valuable signals. Environmentally unfriendly acts could also be marked. For example, 
certain cars could have mandatory stickers such as: ‘Environmentalist warning: this car is 
highly inefficient; its emissions contribute lung cancer and hazardous climate change.’ 
 
Milinski’s ingenious experiment is thought provoking and captures the essence of the 
problem.  Let us play this game at company retreats, schools and at home. We all need to 
get the feel for being involved in a ‘collective risk social dilemma’ and learn strategies 
for its solution. 
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Figure 1. Climate lost. Here is an example where a group failed to reach the target. After 
8 rounds their climate account contained 90 Euros. In the 9
th round, 4 of the 6 players 
contributed the maximum amount of 4 Euros each. There were two free riders who 
contributed nothing. In the last round, one of the free riders contributes 2 Euros, the other 
one still nothing. Three of altruists gave 2 Euros each. It was not enough. The final 
amount came to 114 Euros. Everything was lost. The dashed green line represents the 
target amount that should be invested per round (A) and the cumulative target for each 
round (B).  
 